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Since 1950, a large number of Arab countries have enacted 
constitutions containing provisions that declare Islamic norms to be a 
source of legislation. The wording of these provisions varies in 
subtle but significant ways. Arab constitutions use different terms to 
describe the Islamic norms that serve as a source of law. Some refer 
to “fiqh,” others to “sharia,” and still others to “the principles of 
sharia.” Furthermore, these constitutions characterize the role of 
Islamic norms differently. Most clauses describe Islamic norms 
either as “a chief source of legislation” (masdarun raisiun li’l tashri’) 
or as “the chief source of legislation” (al-masdar al-raisi li’l-
tashri’),1 although a few use slightly different formulations.2 Many 
constitutions drafted or amended in the wake of the so-called Arab 
Spring of 2011 are likely to include such sharia-as-source-of-
legislation (“SSL”) provisions. 
Where did SSL provisions come from, and what do they 
accomplish? Today, most academics and policy makers seem to 
accept that the impact of an SSL provision will depend on its 
wording. Provisions making Islamic norms “a chief source” of 
legislation have never been understood to require that state 
legislation be consistent with sharia norms; conversely, constitutions 
making sharia norms “the chief source” or “the only source” of 
legislation have always been understood to create such a 
requirement.3 The distinction is important, they believe, because a 
 
 1. See, e.g., DUSTUR JUMHURIYYA AL ‘ARABIYYA AL-SURIYYA 
[CONSTITUTION] Feb. 24, 2012, art. 3 (Syria), available at http://www.sana.sy/ara/ 
369/2012/02/24/400634.htm, translated at http://www.sana.sy/eng/337/2012/02/ 
23/401178.htm (providing that Islamic norms will be “a chief source of 
legislation”); DUSTUR [CONSTITUTION] July 13, 1999, art. 1 (Qatar), translated at 
http://english.mofa.gov.qa/details.cfm?id=80 (stating that Islam and sharia law will 
be “a chief source” of legislation). The word I translate here as “chief” (raisi) is 
often translated as “principal.” For an explanation of why I prefer the term “chief,” 
see Clark B. Lombardi, Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt: 
The Constitutionalization of the Sharia in a Modern Arab State, 37 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 81, 87 (1998) (explaining that “[t]he rai’is of something is usually 
its leader or most important part”). 
 2. A few describe the role of sharia norms in other ways, for example, as “the 
source” or as “a foundation source of legislation.” Such alternate renditions are, 
however, outliers. See, e.g., DOUSTOUR JOUMHOURIAT AL-IRAQ [CONSTITUTION] 
OF 2005, art. 2, sec. 1 (Iraq), translated at www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_ 
constitution.pdf (stating that Islam is “a foundation source of legislation”). 
 3. This position is sometimes asserted within the Arab world itself and is 
extremely common among non-Arab observers. See, e.g., Ashley S. Deeks & 
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constitution that requires legislation to respect Islamic law is 
inconsistent with liberal values. Working from these assumptions, 
the U.S. government in 2004 worked hard to prevent the government 
of occupied Iraq from drafting a constitution that made Islam “the 
chief source” of legislation.4 More recently, media accounts of 
constitutional deliberations in Arab countries have followed closely 
the debates about whether to make Islamic norms “the chief source 
of legislation.” These accounts have implicitly assumed that the role 
of Islam in the legal system will be determined largely by the 
outcomes of these debates.5  
 
Matthew D. Burton, Iraq’s Constitution: A Drafting History, 40 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 1, 5–11 (2007) (noting that, during the drafting of the Iraqi Constitution, Shia 
Islamists advocated for inclusion of a provision making Islam “the” chief source of 
legislation, while the United States, Kurds, and other secular Iraqis feared that 
making Islam “the” chief source rather than “a” chief source would result in Iraq 
becoming a strictly Islamic state to the exclusion of rights, protections, and secular 
influences). 
 4. See Gihane Tabet, Women in Personal Status Laws: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Palestine, Syria, at 10 UNESCO SHS (SHS Papers in Women’s Studies/Gender 
Research Paper Series 10 No. 4, 2005) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SHS/pdf/Women_in_P
ersonal_Status_Laws.pdf (reporting that, in 2004, U.S. Transitional Administrator 
Paul Bremer stated that, in occupied Iraq, “Islam is the official religion of the Iraqi 
State and one of the sources of the law,” but clarified that Islam is “not . . . the 
main source of the law” and insisted that he would veto any draft constitution for 
an independent Iraq that made Islam the chief or principal source of legislation). 
One year later, U.S. figures had not changed their view on the implications of 
adopting a constitution that made Islam “the” chief source of legislation. In an 
August 14, 2005, CNN interview, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad opined: “The 
difference between ‘the’ and ‘a’ source, or a principal source, is that there are other 
sources that also have to be respected and taken into account. That’s the principles 
of democracy, principles of human rights, and we do not want to see a hierarchy of 
sources. And I believe that ultimately, the answer will be ‘a’, not ‘the’, and that 
these other sources will also have to be recognized as important sources of laws in 
this new Iraq.” Interview by Wolf Blitzer with Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. 
Ambassador to Afg. (Aug. 14, 2005), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/ 
TRANSCRIPTS/0512/11/le.01.html. 
 5. See, e.g., Kareem Fahim, Tunisia Says Constitution Will Not Cite Islamic 
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/world/ 
africa/tunisia-says-constitution-will-not-cite-islamic-law.html (noting that, when 
Tunisia’s main Islamist party said in 2012 that it would accept a constitution that 
did not mention Islamic law as a source of legislation, it was “signaling a forceful 
break with ultraconservatives who have been demanding an Islamic state”); Edyer 
Peralta, Interim Leader Says Sharia Law Will Guide Libya, NAT’L PUB. RADIO THE 
TWO-WAY BLOG (Oct. 24, 2011, 6:26 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/the 
two-way/2011/10/24/141668281/interim-leader-says-sharia-law-will-guide-libya 
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This article will examine the history of SSL clauses in the Arab 
world. It will discuss how such clauses came to be included in Arab 
constitutions in the first place and how different clauses have been 
interpreted over the years. It will demonstrate that Arab 
understandings of these clauses have evolved over time. If we focus 
on the way in which SSL clauses have recently been interpreted and 
applied, the conventional wisdom of many Western academics, 
policy makers, and journalists is partly correct. In some ways, 
however, it may need to be revised.  
Part I will provide background necessary to understand why 
Arabs, starting in the 1950s, began to adopt provisions describing 
sharia as a “source” of legislation. Parts II and III will survey all the 
Arab countries that adopted SSL provisions from 1950 to the start of 
the Arab Spring—discussing countries in the order that they adopted 
a clause. For each country, this article will look at the circumstances 
under which the country decided to adopt its SSL provision and why 
that country chose to phrase the SSL clause in the way that it did. It 
will then briefly explore how courts in these countries have to date 
interpreted and applied the national SSL provision. Part IV will 
explore the conclusions that we can draw from the history of SSL 
clauses.  
Part IV begins by arguing that, if we focus on the way in which 
SSL clauses are interpreted today, the conventional wisdom about 
their meaning needs to be refined. When they first appeared, SSL 
clauses, no matter how they were worded, were thought to be 
ambiguous about whether the state can legislate in a way that 
violates sharia principles. After decades of debate about the meaning 
of these clauses, Arabs have taken a large step toward the positions 
described above. Provisions stating that Islamic law is the chief 
source of legislation are generally understood today to mean that 
states are constitutionally barred from enacting un-Islamic 
legislation. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom. The 
conventional wisdom may be wrong, however, to say categorically 
that constitutions containing weaker SSL provisions (or contain no 
 
(reporting that the decision by Libya’s transitional government in 2011 to enact a 
transitional constitution designating Islamic law as the “main source” of legislation 
“will place Libya alongside Arab nations such as Egypt and Iraq that ensure that no 
laws contradict the tenets of Islam”). 
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SSL provision at all) will be interpreted to create no judicially 
enforceable constitutional bar on un-Islamic legislation. Under 
certain circumstances, a constitution that does not make Islamic law 
the chief source of legislation will be interpreted to prohibit un-
Islamic legislation.6 Part IV goes on to argue that conventional 
wisdom may exaggerate the impact that constitutional prohibitions of 
un-Islamic legislation have on the viability of the liberal legal order. 
The article will conclude with some brief thoughts about the possible 
policy implications of my findings.  
I. BACKGROUND  
SSL clauses first appeared in the 1950s, when a new Syrian 
constitution declared that “Islamic fiqh [traditional scholarly 
interpretations of Islamic law] shall be the chief source of 
legislation.”7 At the time, this clause was not understood to require 
that all state law be derived from fiqh. To understand what the 
drafters of the Syrian constitution and the Syrian public thought the 
clause meant, it is helpful to have some background about the 
evolution of Islamic legal and political theory.  
In the pre-modern era, some states recognized an obligation to 
ensure that all laws applied in their courts were (a) consistent with a 
handful of core scriptural rules that the traditional class of religious 
scholars, known as the fuqaha’, recognized as unambiguous and (b) 
did not harm what the fuqaha’ recognized as the legitimate interests 
of Muslim society.8 Nathan Brown and Adel Omar Sherif have 
 
 6. This may be because courts believe that a weak SSL clause must be 
interpreted in light of other constitutional provisions and state practice and that, in 
context, it implies a ban on un-Islamic legislation. Alternatively, it may be because 
the constitution contains other provisions that can be interpreted as establishing an 
independent bar on un-Islamic legislation. Constitutions whose SSL clauses make 
sharia something less than “the chief source” of legislation may still be interpreted 
to require state respect for sharia principles. 
 7. AL-DUSTUR AL-SURI [CONSTITUTION] Sept. 5, 1950 (Syria). 
 8. See Frank Vogel, Siyasa, Part III (In the Sense of Siyasa Shari’a), in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 695 (3d ed.) (locating the origins of siyasa shar`iyya in 
works from the eleventh century of the Common Era). The concept is most 
famously associated, however, with the work of the thirteenth- to fourteenth-
century scholar Ibn Taymiyya, who wrote a book called al-Siyasa al-Shar`iyya, 
and that of his disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, who wrote extensively on the 
concept. See generally IBN TAYMIYYA, AL-SIYĀSA AL-SHAR‘IYYA FĪ IṣLĀH AL- 
RĀ’Ī WA AL-RA‘IYYA repr. (1988); IBN QAYYIM AL-JAWZIYYA, THE LEGAL 
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demonstrated that a number of nineteenth-century Arab constitutions, 
along with some constitutions in the Persian world, implicitly 
seemed to recognize that principle.9 In the early twentieth century, 
 
METHODS IN ISLAMIC ADMINISTRATION (Ala’eddin Khorfa trans., 2000). For 
analyses of Ibn Taymiyya’s thought, see generally ANN S. LAMBTON, STATE AND 
GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM 143–51 (1981) (noting that Ibn Taymiyya’s 
work centered on the central role that shar`iyya and service to God should play in 
modern governments); HENRI LAOUST, ESSAI SUR LES DOCTRINES ET POLITIQUES 
DE TAKI-D-DIN AMAD B TAIMIYA 278–318 (1939); ERWIN ROSENTHAL, 
POLITICAL THOUGHT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM 51–61 (1958) (explaining that Ibn 
Taymiyya focused more on the ideal Muslim community governed by shar`iyya 
under Muslim prophets and lawmakers, rather than the political realities of the 
time). Among legal historians, there is some debate about whether early theorists 
of siyasa shar`iyya, such as Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, believed 
rulers must defer to the judgment of the `ulama’ on the crucial questions of when 
the scriptures clearly required something or on whether a law served the public 
interest. Compare Vogel, supra, with Barber Johansen, A Perfect Law in an 
Imperfect Society: Ibn Taymiyya’s Concept of “Governance in the Name of the 
Sacred Law,” in THE LAW APPLIED: CONTEXTUALIZING THE ISLAMIC SHARIA, 
259–94 (Peri Bearman et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya saw the legal analysis of the ulama as merely “interpreted 
laws” that are “respectable products of qualified human reasoning but as such . . . 
cannot command general obedience and do not, therefore, qualify as the law that 
should be applied by the political authorities”). This appears to have been accepted 
in some of the important empires and provided a model going forward. Such an 
interpretation of the principle became fully institutionalized and bureaucratized in 
the Mediterranean during the period of the Ottoman Empire. 
 9. See Nathan J. Brown & Adel Omar Sherif, Inscribing the Islamic Shari’a in 
Arab Constitutional Law, in ISLAMIC LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF MODERNITY 
57–59 (Yvonne Haddad & Barbara Stowasser eds., 2004) (noting, for example, the 
use of “Islamic political vocabulary” in the 1861 Tunisian Constitution and the 
institutionalization of Islam as the state religion in the 1876 Ottoman Constitution). 
On the incorporation of the principle into the Ottoman Constitution, see HASAN 
KAYALI, ARABS AND YOUNG TURKS: OTTOMANISM, ARABISM, AND ISLAMISM IN 
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1908–1918 23 (1997) (describing the “Young Ottoman” 
movement of 1876, contemporaneous with the 1876 Constitution, which attempted 
to harmonize modern constitutional principles with Islamic law); see also Brown 
& Sherif, supra, at 59 (explaining that the 1876 Ottoman Constitution granted the 
sultan, who had absolute authority, the duty to execute sharia law). On the 
incorporation of an analogue of this principle into the 1906 Persian Constitution 
and Afghan Constitutions, see Supplementary Fundamental Laws of Persia of Oct 
7, 1907, arts. 1–2 (Iran), translated in EDWARD G. BROWNE, THE PERSIAN 
REVOLUTION OF 1905–1909 372–73 (1910) (establishing Islam as the official 
religion of Persia and providing that the laws of Persia may not “be at variance 
with” Islamic principles and law); NIZAMNAMAH-YE-ASASI-E-DAULAT-E-ALYAH-
E-AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 9, 1923, 20 Hamal 1302, arts. 21, 72 (Afg.) 
(M.A. Ansri, trans.), available at http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/constitution_ 
1923-1302_english_nizamnamah-ye-asasi-e-daulat-e-aliyah-e-afghanistan.pdf 
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however, the rulers of Arab states began to challenge the idea that 
their laws would be illegitimate if they contradicted the traditional 
religious scholars’ understandings of Islamic law. Accordingly, Arab 
constitutions during this period ceased to include any provisions 
indicating that the state was obliged to respect Islamic legal 
principles.10  
States could stop recognizing the traditional principle of siyasa 
shar’iyya because Muslim society itself was coming to question the 
value of traditional interpretations of Islamic law. Muslims 
maintained their conviction that human salvation rested upon 
compliance with the fuqaha’’s interpretation of Islamic law and that 
states must therefore respect this interpretation of Islamic law as 
well.11 Many, however, did not. Some simply moved toward a 
secularist position.12 Others struggled to develop an alternative, 
 
(providing that court cases will be decided “in accordance” with sharia law and 
sharia law will be given “careful consideration” in the legislative process). All of 
these constitutions were drafted in countries that had no tradition of constitutional 
review, and they were clearly not designed to be enforced by courts. They do, 
however, reflect a public admission by the ruler of a constitutional monarchy that 
his legitimacy depended on his acting in a manner that is consistent with Islamic 
principles. 
 10. See generally NATHAN BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NON-
CONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR 
ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 35–66 (Shahrough Akhavi & Said Amir Arjomand 
eds., 2002). It is not entirely clear why majority Muslim nations shied away from 
adopting constitutional Islamization clauses for much of the twentieth century. 
With respect to the Arab world, Brown has suggested that Arab constitutions for 
much of the twentieth century were simply not designed to be “constitutionalist” 
documents. Arab elites during this period consistently drafted constitutions with an 
eye to giving the executive maximum flexibility to rule as it chose. The drafters of 
such constitutions had little appetite to promise in constitutional texts that they 
were bound to respect Islamic norms. While it was sometimes impossible to avoid 
making some gestures toward the protection of liberal rights provisions, such 
provisions were coupled with other provisions that allowed the government to 
define the scope of those rights or to avoid scrutiny of any violations of those 
rights. See id. at 63–66. 
 11. See id. at 165 (explaining that even as Arab governments in the twentieth 
century ceased deferring to the fuqaha’ and traditional interpretations of sharia 
law, modern intellectuals, such as Rashid Rida, envisioned new government 
structures and constitutional orders that would still be based on sharia law and 
would rely heavily on consultations with the fuqaha’). 
 12. See id. at 163 (noting that many Muslim intellectuals in the mid-twentieth 
century began to look toward Western scholars and models of government for 
inspiration). 
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“modern” understanding of Islamic law that Muslims should obey 
and that would inform the law of a modern Islamic state.13 Over time, 
constitutions would come to be drafted in a way that reflected this 
new understanding of an Islamic state. The rise of SSL clauses and 
the evolution of the public’s understanding of these clauses resulted 
from efforts to constitutionalize a new understanding of sharia and its 
role in the state.  
In the early twentieth century, the Syrian-born Islamic thinker 
Rashid Rida influenced the thought of many Muslims around the 
Arab world and beyond, including most notably the early leaders of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. Like the traditional fuqaha’, Rida argued 
that the state should apply law that was consistent with the clear 
scriptural principles and that served the public interest.14 Unlike 
them, he used a new, distinctly modern method of identifying clear 
scriptural principles, and he embraced an untraditional method of 
determining whether a state law advanced the public welfare. 
Rida’s younger contemporary, the great Egyptian lawyer, legal 
theorist, and code-drafter, Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri, departed even 
more radically from the traditional theory of siyasa shar’iyya.15 
 
 13. See id. (remarking on the rise, during the mid-twentieth century, of modern 
Islamic intellectuals who criticized traditional Islamic scholars for their overly 
rigid approaches to sharia law). 
 14. HAMID ENAYAT, MODERN ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT 78–81 (1982) 
(noting that Rashid Rida sought an Islamic state both grounded in sharia law and 
able to address problems through dynamic interpretations of sharia law). 
 15. See Guy Bechor, The Sanhuri Code, and the Emergence of Modern Arab 
Civil Law (1932 to 1949), in 29 STUDIES IN ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY 1, 2 (Ruud 
Peters & A. Kevin Reinhart eds., 2007) (arguing that Sanhuri’s Egyptian Civil 
Code should be viewed “as part of the social discourse and historical context of its 
period,” rather than as an isolated and individualistic attempt at legal reform). The 
literature on Sanhuri is enormous and growing. In English, the first major study 
was a two-part article by Enid Hill. See generally Enid Hill, Al-Sanhuri and 
Islamic Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic Law in the Life and Work of 
‘Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar, 1895–1971, 3 
ARAB L.Q. 33 (1988) [hereinafter Hill, Pt. I] (reviewing Sanhuri’s legal theories, 
his place in Egyptian legal history, and his early academic life); Enid Hill, Al-
Sanhuri and Islamic Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic Law in the Life 
and Work of ‘Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar, 
1895–1971, 3 ARAB L.Q. 182 (1988) [hereinafter Hill, Pt. II] (providing an 
overview of Sanhuri’s participation in political life and contributions to Egypt’s 
Civil Code); Amr Shalakany, Between Identity and Distribution; Sanhuri, 
Genealogy, and the Will to Islamise, 8 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 201 (2001) (providing 
a “genealogical study” of Sanhuri’s contributions to the Islamization and 
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Inspired by European nationalist legal theory, Sanhuri argued that a 
handful of principles, consistently followed at all times and places, 
could be identified as common to all the competing interpretations 
of Islamic law that traditional scholars had proposed over the 
centuries. For Sanhuri, the law of a modern Islamic state must be 
consistent both with those implicit principles and with the public 
interest.16 Many of these non-derogable principles were extremely 
general, and Sanhuri concluded that most rules found in modern 
European codes (codes that had been transplanted into the Arab 
world during the colonial era) were consistent with them.17 More 
controversially, he suggested that the public interest might actually 
require modern Arab states to apply (or continue applying) many of 
these transplanted European rules even though, in some areas, the 
government might reasonably decide instead to take a rule directly 
from the fiqh tradition.18  
As Arab nations began to break free of colonial control in the mid-
twentieth century, the fuqaha’ continued to push unsuccessfully for 
the state to reform its laws so that they were consistent with the 
traditional theory of siyasa shar’iyya. Many of the most important 
Islamist political factions, however, allied themselves instead with 
modernist theories, and as Arab states began to de-colonize after 
World War II, modernist Islamist factions, particularly those who 
embraced Sanhuri’s theory of Islamic law, strongly influenced the 
course of mid-century Arab legal reform. Sanhuri was commissioned 
to draft the new 1949 Civil Code for Egypt.19 Not surprisingly, this 
 
modernization of Egyptian law). 
 16. See Shalakany, supra note 15, at 204 (noting Sanhuri’s goals in 
modernizing Egyptian law were two-part, in that he hoped both to follow Islamic 
principles and promote social justice). 
 17. See id. at 228 (remarking that some readings of Sanhuri’s contributions to 
the Egyptian Civil Code focus on “how his functionalist selections of Islamic law 
were made to coincide with modern European legislation”). 
 18. See id. at 234 (recalling an Egyptian Senate meeting in which Sanhuri was 
criticized for advocating for the codification of Egyptian case law, similar to 
codification in European states, to which he responded that codification would 
conform with Islamic law because Egyptian case law already conforms with 
Islamic law). 
 19. See Hill, Pt. II, supra note 15, at 182 (explaining that Sanhuri drafted the 
new civil code “using comparisons of more than 20 modern codes, the 
jurisprudence of the Egyptian courts, and the Islamic Shari’a”). 
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code retained a significant number of colonial-era rules.20 Although 
the fuqaha’ and Islamists associated with the Brotherhood criticized 
the code as only pseudo-Islamic,21 the code was widely celebrated in 
the Arab world and beyond as a successful attempt to harmonize 
Islamic with European law. In short order, many of the Arab states 
then emerging from colonial domination decided to adopt Sanhuri-
inspired codes.22 By doing so, they could indigenize national legal 
systems, as well as ensure that the legal system remained consistent 
with essential elements of the transplanted European legal codes 
under which legal relationships had already been formed.23 All of the 
so-called “Sanhuri codes” resembled the 1949 Egyptian Code. Thus, 
each arguably used Islamic law as a “source” of law in two different 
ways. First, each code assumed that embedded in the fiqh tradition 
were a limited number of extremely general principles induced from 
the fiqh tradition as a whole. Second, each code incorporated some 
actual rules from the fiqh tradition.  
The Sanhuri codes recognized that the code might have “gaps”—
meaning that a judge might face legal questions that could not be 
answered by reference to the rules in the code. The Sanhuri codes 
clarified that, in such a case, judges were supposed to fashion new 
 
 20. See id. at 187 (noting that the new civil code included provisions from 
previous legislation relating to inheritance, gifts, ownership of units in a building, 
building on leased property, risks and defects in purchases, and disposition of 
property during illness). 
 21. See FARHAT J. ZIADEH, LAWYERS, THE RULE OF LAW, AND LIBERALISM IN 
MODERN EGYPT 139 (1968) (“The utilization of shari’ah as only a supplement to 
other sources was unacceptable to the traditional groups, particularly those trained 
in shari’ah law.”). For western commentary consistent with these criticisms, see, 
for example, HERBERY J. LIBESNY, THE LAW OF THE NEAR & MIDDLE EAST 95 
(1975) (distinguishing between the Egyptian Civil Code, which compelled judges, 
in the absence of an applicable statute, to apply custom first and then sharia law, 
and the civil codes of Syria and Iraq, which compelled judges to prioritize sharia 
law over custom). But see Hill, Pt. II, supra note 15, at 189 (arguing that, due to 
the correlation between custom and sharia law in Egypt, the practical difference 
between the Egyptian Civil Code and the civil codes of Syria and Iraq is likely 
“negligible”). 
 22. See Hill, Pt. I, supra note 15, at 39–40 (explaining that, with Sanhuri’s 
assistance, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Kuwait adopted civil codes similar to Egypt’s, 
which were then used as models for legal reform in Qatar, Jordan, Bahrain, and the 
United Arab Emirates). 
 23. See id. (noting that the Sanhuri codes combined secular elements, a 
commitment to Islamic law, and a degree of indigenization specific to each state’s 
legal history). 
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rules using roughly the same method Sanhuri had used to select rules 
for inclusion in the code.24 Different codes, however, took different 
views about whether, when looking for rules to fill the gaps, judges 
should look first to try and find a rule from the fiqh literature that 
was both consistent with overarching principles and consistent with 
the public interests. Then, only if they failed to find such a rule, they 
should look to other sources. The Egyptian code was ambiguous on 
this point. When Syria adopted a Sanhuri code in 1949, it specifically 
instructed judges to look first to Islamic fiqh when filling gaps in 
legislation.25 Shortly thereafter, Syria adopted the Arab world’s first 
SSL clause.  
II. THE FIRST SSL CLAUSE: ARTICLE 2 OF THE 
SYRIAN CONSTITUTION OF 1950 
After independence in the mid-1940s, the Syrian government 
engaged in a series of legislative reforms culminating with the 
decision in 1949 to adopt a Sanhuri code.26 One year later, a new 
 
 24. See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1 (Egypt), translated in LIBESNY, supra 
note 21 (providing that, in the absence of an applicable statute, Egyptian judges 
should bridge the gap by applying custom, sharia law, principles of natural law, 
and rules of equity, in that order). Another feature of the new code, according to 
Sanhuri, is “flexibility.” The new code, he says, “substituted ‘flexible standards’ in 
place of ‘inflexible rules,’ so that ‘solutions can change when conditions change.’” 
Article 1 of the Egyptian code thus suggested that judges should develop rules that 
were consistent with custom—but Sanhuri seems to have understood that in Egypt, 
custom is fiqh as interpreted within that country over the centuries. On this point, 
see Hill, Part II, supra note 15 at 188–90. Some other countries wanted to stress 
more explicitly that judges who developed new laws to fill “gaps” in the code 
should begin with fiqh-as-historically-interpreted-and-applied-within-a-particular-
country. When Kuwait adopted a new Civil Code with a provision identical to the 
Egyptian code, the official explanatory memorandum published alongside the code 
made clear that the “custom” to which judges should look first only referred to 
custom consistent with sharia. “[T]he learned commentator on the Civil Code 
regards the latter as already being the correct view of Kuwaiti law, even on the 
present wording of the Constitution. His Commentary is a learned piece of analysis 
which we must study in some detail because of its relevance not only as far as 
Kuwait is concerned (it is published with the Code and thus has legal force), but 
because it expounds on general principles which are important for other Arab 
countries as well.” See William M. Ballantyne, ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES ON ARAB 
LAWS 62 (2000). 
 25. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1 (Syria), translated in LIBESNY, supra note 21. 
 26. Nabil Saleh, Civil Codes of Arab Countries: The Sanhuri Codes, 8 ARAB 
L.Q. 161, 161 (1993). 
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military government began to draft Syria’s first post-independence 
constitution.27 Islamists, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, pushed 
vigorously for the new constitution to contain a clause declaring 
Islam the official religion of the new state,28 and in 1950 the 
Constituent Assembly produced a draft constitution establishing 
Islam as Syria’s official religion.29 Syria’s religious minorities were 
horrified, and after a period of occasionally violent contest,30 the 
provision was dropped. Apparently to mollify the disappointed 
Islamists, the final draft of the constitution included a provision 
carving out a role for Islamic law in the state. This provision did not 
explicitly require all state laws to be consistent with Islamic legal 
principles. Instead, it said only: “Islamic fiqh shall be the chief 
source of legislation (al-fiqh al-Islami hu al-masdar al-raisi li’l 
tashri’).”31  
What did this mean? In a 1952 article about the constitution, Majid 
Khadduri suggests strongly that Syrians believed that this provision 
would have little practical impact—less than a provision making 
Islam the official religion of the state and less than one requiring 
state law to respect Islamic law.32 Indeed, it seems to have been 
 
 27. See generally Majid Khadduri, Constitutional Development in Syria: With 
an Emphasis on the Constitution of 1950, 5 MIDDLE E. J. 137, 151 (1951) 
(providing a history of Syrian constitutions through 1951). 
 28. JORANAES REISSNER, IDEOLOGIE UND POLITICK DER MUSLIMBRUDER 
SYRIENS 379–91 (1980). 
 29. Khadduri, supra note 27, at 152. 
 30. RADWAN ZIADEH, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE CONCEPT OF 
DEMOCRACY 5 (1973), available at https://www.csidonline.org/9th_annual_conf/ 
Radwan_Ziadeh_CSID_paper.pdf. 
 31. AL-DUSTUR AL-SURI 9/5/1950 [Syrian Constitution of September 5, 1950] 
Arabic Version, reprinted in YUSUF Q. KHOURY, AL-DUSATIR FI’L `ALAM AL-
`ARABI 1839–1987: NUSUS WA TA`DILAT [THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE ARAB 
WORLD 1839-1987: TEXTS AND AMENDMENTS] 259–71 (1989), available  
at http://www.righttononviolence.org/mecf/wp-content/uploads/1950/09/1950Syria 
.pdf. Translation by author. Note that some secondary sources from the 1950s 
translate this provision into English as “Islamic law shall be the main source of 
legislation,” thus rendering “al-fiqh Islami” as “Islamic law” rather than Islamic 
fiqh and “al-masdar al-raisi” as “main source” rather than “chief source.” See, e.g., 
Fauzi M. Najjar, Islam and Modern Democracy, 20 REV. OF POL. 164, 169 (1958) 
(emphasis added) (“Islamic Law shall be the main source of legislation.”); 
Khadduri, supra note 27, at 153 (emphasis added) (“Islamic Law shall be the main 
source of legislation.”). 
 32. See Khadduri, supra note 27, at 152–53 (noting that this provision was 
likely included to appease the hardline Muslims after the removal of the provision 
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intended simply to describe the legal regime then in force in Syria—
where the civil code had been drafted using Sanhuri’s distinctive 
method and where the family laws applicable to Muslims were 
drawn largely from fiqh. It was apparently not understood to create 
any requirement that going forward all laws be “consistent with 
fiqh.” Otherwise, Syria’s numerous non-Muslim minorities would 
have been likely to protest the provision, and they seem not to have 
done so.33  
The 1950 Syrian constitution was short-lived. After a short period 
of political turmoil, Syria joined with Egypt, which was then under the 
authoritarian rule of General Gamal Abd al-Nasir. The united entity, 
called the United Arab Republic (U.A.R), adopted a 1958 constitution 
that did not mention Islamic law as a source of law. Syria seceded 
from the U.A.R. in 1961 and was governed by a provisional 
constitution. In 1973, Syria enacted a new permanent constitution, 
which again, pointedly, did not make Islam the official religion of the 
state. It also demoted Islamic fiqh from “the chief source of 
legislation” to “a chief source of legislation.” This clause survived in 
the 2012 constitution recently adopted by the embattled Assad regime 
in response to the uprisings after the Arab Spring.34 The decision to 
demote fiqh from “the” to “a” chief source of legislation reflects the 
evolution of Arab thinking about SSL clauses during the 1960s and 
’70s. By 1972, there was still debate about how to interpret clauses 
making Islamic norms “a” or “the” chief source of legislation. 
Nonetheless, it was considered safer for a country that did not want to 
constitutionally conform its laws to Islamic norms to describe those 
Islamic norms as “a” rather than “the” chief source of legislation.  
 
establishing Islam as the state religion). 
 33. See id. at 152 (describing the violent uprising of Syria’s minorities in 
response to the provision establishing Islam as the state religion, and implying that 
the alternate decision to establish Islam as the source of legislation was seen as a 
compromise that would prevent further violence). 
 34. See DUSTUR JUMHURIYYA AL ‘ARABIYYA AL-SURIYYA [CONSTITUTION] 
Feb. 24, 2012, art. 3 (Syria), available at http://www.sana.sy/ara/369/2012/ 
02/24/400634.htm, translated at http://www.sana.sy/eng/337/2012/02/23/ 
401178.htm (providing that Islamic norms will be “a chief source of legislation”). 
Translation by author. The cited document was a “draft” that was put to 
referendum on February 26, 2012. According to the government, voters approved 
the new Constitution. See Syria Says New Constitution Approved, AL-JAZEERA 
(Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/02/2012227 
132547956907.html. 
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III. THE SPREAD OF ISLAMIC “SOURCE” 
CLAUSES: KUWAIT AND BEYOND 
It was not until 1962 that a country other than Syria decided to 
draft a constitution that included an SSL clause. Thereafter, however, 
a growing number of Arab governments began to adopt them. 
A. KUWAIT  
For the first half of the twentieth century, the Emirate of Kuwait 
was effectively controlled by the British.35 In the late 1950s, while 
still under effective British control, Kuwait had Sanhuri draft codes 
of legislation.36 Shortly thereafter, in 1961, it achieved independence 
and was admitted into the United Nations.37 At that point, it began to 
draft a constitution for the new state with the assistance of Egyptian 
advisors, among whom was apparently Sanhuri himself.38 The 
constitution that the Emir developed with their assistance was 
reviewed and modified by a constituent assembly of both elected and 
appointed members.39 The final constitution was ratified and 
 
 35. Ahmed Al-Suwaidi, Development of the Legal Systems of the Gulf Arab 
States, 8 ARAB L.Q. 289, 289 (1993). 
 36. See Hill, Pt. II, supra note 15, at 202 (“In 1959 [Sanhuri] went to Kuwait, 
where he decided against providing a civil code, but included much of what had 
constituted other civil codes in the Kuwaiti commercial code, provided a maritime 
law, a law of compensation, and a law establishing the primary courts.”); see also 
William Ballantyne, Paper Delivered to Middle East Association, 2 (Dec. 9, 2008), 
http://www.serlecourt.co.uk/Members/Article.aspx?MemberID=16&ArticleID=43 
(noting that, unlike Sanhuri’s civil codes, the commercial codes, including 
Kuwait’s, largely do not contain references to sharia law). 
 37. See Majid S. Hussain, A Critical Study of Constitutional and Judicial 
Development in Kuwait, 61–62 (June 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Newcastle Upon Tyne), available at http://www.academia.edu/19 
21861/A_critical_study_of_constitutional_and_judicial_development_in_Kuwait. 
 38. Ballantyne reports that the Kuwaiti constitution was drafted largely by 
Sanhuri. However, Nathan Brown reports that the Emir apparently worked with a 
number of Egyptian legal advisors to develop a constitution that drew upon the 
Ottoman Constitution of 1876 as a model but contained numerous provisions that 
reflected Kuwait’s unique history. See NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN 
THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF 165–67 (Charles Tripp ed., 
1997) [hereinafter BROWN, COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF] (noting that the 
“chief drafter” of the Kuwaiti Constitution was Uthman Kalil Uthman, an Egyptian 
colleague of Sanhuri); BROWN, supra note 10, at 54–57 (providing the context for 
and details of the drafting process of the Kuwaiti Constitution). 
 39. BROWN, COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF, supra note 38, at 165–66. 
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published in 1962,40 along with an official “explanatory 
memorandum.”41 It proved extremely influential in the Gulf region.42  
Kuwaiti society was highly traditional and steeped in a 
conservative Muslim ethos. Non-Muslim minorities were small. 
Article 2 of the new Kuwaiti constitution made Islam the official 
religion of the state and also declared “the Islamic sharia is a chief 
source of legislation” (al-sharia al-islamiyya masdarun raisiun li’l 
tashri’).43 There appears to have been some concern that in this 
overwhelmingly Muslim society, a constitutional choice both to 
establish Islam and to make Islam “the chief source of legislation” 
might be read in combination to suggest a justiciable requirement 
that all Kuwaiti law respect Islamic principles. This probably 
explains why the Kuwaiti drafters departed from the wording of 
Syria’s 1950 SSL clause in two ways.  
First, Article 2 referred to sharia rather than fiqh as a chief source 
of legislation. Although some Muslims have used the term sharia as 
a synonym for fiqh, many do not. Given the influence of Sanhuri on 
the Kuwaiti constitution, the Kuwaiti drafters may have been 
signaling that the government had not and did not expect the 
 
 40. See DUSTUR DAWLAT AL-KUWAIT [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 11, 1962 
(Kuwait), reprinted in YUSUF Q. KHOURY, AL-DUSATIR FI’L `ALAM AL-`ARABI 
1839–1987: NUSUS WA TA`DILAT [THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE ARAB WORLD 
1839–1987: TEXTS AND AMENDMENTS] 409–418 (1989), available  
at http://www.righttononviolence.org/mecf/wp-content/uploads/1962/11/1962 
Kuwait.pdf, translated at http://www.kuwaitconstitution.org/kuwaitconstitution 
english.html. Another online copy of the Kuwaiti constitution as amended to date 
can be found at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=181002 (last 
visited May 27, 2012). As can be seen, there have been no significant amendments. 
 41. See KUWAITI COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.da.gov.kw/eng/kuwaitinfo/political.php (last visited Jan. 9, 2013) 
(“The constitution of the State of Kuwait includes (183) articles and an explanatory 
memorandum.”). 
 42. See William M. Ballantyne, The Constitutions of the Gulf States: A 
Comparative Study, 1 ARAB L.Q. 158, 158 (1986) (noting that, when the United 
Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain emerged as independent states in the early 
1970s, they used the Kuwaiti Constitution as a model); cf. BROWN, supra note 10, 
at 59–61 (explaining that each of these countries modified the Kuwaiti 
Constitution in significant ways). 
 43. DUSTUR DAWLAT AL-KUWAIT [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 11, 1962, art. 2 
(Kuwait), translated at http://www.kuwaitconstitution.org/kuwaitconstitution 
english.html; see also Said Amir Arjomand, Islamic Constitutionalism, 3 ANN. 
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 115, 123 (2007). 
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legislature to refer directly to rules of fiqh when it drafted future 
laws. Rather, the government would draw upon the universal 
principles of sharia that modern scholars like Sanhuri induced from 
the fiqh. Second, the Kuwaiti constitution made sharia “a” rather than 
“the” chief source of legislation. The implication of this change was 
unclear. On its face, it seemed to be that laws would need to be 
consistent not only with the universal principles of sharia but with 
other principles as well. Alternatively, it could be understood to say 
that the constitution permitted the state to adopt laws inconsistent 
with sharia—although they were consistent with some other “chief 
source.”  
The constitution was published with an explanatory note that the 
courts were to use as official guidance. The note did not completely 
resolve the issue. It states that the legislature and executive can 
regulate society according to rules that are not drawn directly from 
fiqh and implies that they can adopt laws inconsistent with fiqh.44 It is 
ambiguous about whether the state must always respect the 
fundamental principles of sharia.45 As a practical matter, however, 
this ambiguity proved to be unimportant. Even if Article 2 required 
the government to legislate in accordance with the essential 
 
 44. Hussain, supra note 37, at 138 (characterizing the explanatory note as 
saying that Article 2 gave “the legislature an Islamic framework within which to 
include other sources of legislation wherever there was a void in Islamic 
jurisprudential legislation. In this case, it would be better to improve or develop 
legal provisions to be compatible with the necessities of environmental 
development”). 
 45. See Saba Habachy, A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law: 
Constitutional Government in Kuwait, 3 COLUM. J. TRASNAT’L L. 116, 116–18 
(1963) (reporting that, when the draft constitution was presented for final approval 
of the emir, it was accompanied by a letter, which may have been the “explanatory 
note,” which stated that the constitution was supposed to bring the principle of 
democracy to Kuwait in a manner that reflected the “factual situation in Kuwait.” 
However, Article 2 provides that the “factual situation” informing the way in 
which the principle of democracy was applied is defined by Kuwait’s commitment 
to Islamic law. In other words, it was a descriptive statement about Kuwait rather 
than a prescriptive statement about what Kuwait would have to do in the future). 
See Mohammad al-Moqatei, Introducing Islamic Law in the Arab Gulf States: A 
Case Study of Kuwait, 4 ARAB L.Q. 138, 142–43 (1989) (summarizing the concern 
of those who opposed an amendment to Article 2 making Islamic law “the chief 
source of legislation,” rather than “a chief source of legislation,” namely that such 
an amendment would invalidate several statutes and lead to “constitutional 
controversy,” in spite of the fact that Article 2 imposes a positive obligation on 
lawmakers to consider Islamic law). 
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principles of Islamic law, leading scholars seem to have believed that 
courts would have no power to hear cases challenging the 
legislature’s judgment that they had complied with that 
requirement.46 In keeping with this body of scholarly interpretation, 
Kuwait’s Constitutional Court has consistently held that Article 2 
does not give it the duty or power to strike down laws that it deems 
inconsistent with sharia norms.  
In 1992, the Constitutional Court heard a case challenging the 
provisions of the Kuwaiti Civil Code that allow for the charging of 
interest.47 The defendant argued that these provisions were 
inconsistent with sharia and should therefore be declared void under 
Article 2. The Court, echoing the explanatory memorandum, held 
that Article 2 made sharia “a source” and not “the only source” of 
law.48 As such, the court held, the government could adopt rules such 
as this one irrespective of the fact that they are inconsistent with 
traditional interpretations of Islamic sharia.49 In this opinion, the 
Court did not make clear whether it was denying the petitioner’s 
assertion that Article 2 barred the state from enacting un-Islamic 
legislation or whether it was merely holding that states had no power 
to enforce the requirement.50 More recently in Nashi v. Dashti, the 
 
 46. Hussain, supra note 37, at 138 (noting that Article 2 grants legislators some 
discretion in their consideration of Islamic law); cf. Al-Moqatei, supra note 45, at 
142–44 (1989) (recalling a proposal in 1984 to amend Article 2, proponents of 
which argued that the Explanatory Note to the Constitution unambiguously 
required the legislature to adopt Islamic law). 
 47. Ballantyne, supra note 36, at 3 (citing Case No. 8/1992/Constitutional 
Court, at 5 (Kuwait)). 
 48. Hussain, supra note 37, at 297–98 (citing Case No. 8/1992/Constitutional 
Court, at 5 (Kuwait)). 
 49. Ballantyne, supra note 36, at 3 (citing Case No. 8/1992/Constitutional 
Court, at 5 (Kuwait)). 
 50. Many observers interpret this court opinion to say that Article 2 of the 
Kuwaiti constitution makes sharia only one source of law among many and does 
not bar the state from adopting laws inconsistent with sharia. See Hussain, supra 
note 37, at 297–98 (finding that the court held that “the constitutional text does not 
prevent the ordinary legislator from using other sources that he sees it suitable, 
without causing a constitutional contradiction”); cf. Ballantyne, supra note 36, at 3 
(characterizing the Constitutional Court’s decision as allowing the code in question 
to “evade” sharia law). It is possible, however, that it is saying something slightly 
different. Although Islamic jurists in the pre-modern world did not permit contracts 
charging interest, there is within the modern world a debate about whether the ban 
was correct. Many continue to argue that the traditional ban is correct. However, 
some leading Islamist thinkers have argued that there are no clear scriptural 
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Kuwaiti court again refused to overturn laws widely thought un-
Islamic.51 
Distressed by the implications of the memo and by the court cases 
just described, conservative Islamists in Kuwait have regularly called 
for Article 2 of the Kuwaiti Constitution to be amended. Some have 
suggested that the Islamic sharia should be made the chief source of 
legislation.52 Against the backdrop of Sanhuri’s theory and the 
experience of Syria as described above, however, many Islamists 
seem to believe that even this clause might not be interpreted to 
require state legislation to conform to sharia either.53 Thus, many 
have more dramatically called for sharia to be listed as the only 
source of legislation.”54 The most recent major push for such an 
amendment took place this past year.55  
 
principles that categorically preclude it and Sanhuri too was not able to induce an 
“essential” sharia principle precluding it. The court might thus be read to be 
reserving an opinion as to whether the law was inconsistent with sharia. In essence, 
it would be saying that the state is barred from enacting laws inconsistent with 
sharia but that cases of non-compliance with sharia are non-justiciable. 
 51. Jill Goldenziel, Veiled Political Questions: Islamic Dress, 
Constitutionalism, and the Ascendance of Courts, 61.1 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 35–36 
(forthcoming Jan. 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2061928 (citing Al-Nashi v. Dashti et al., Constitutional Court of 
Kuwait (2009)) (holding that Law 17 (2005), which required women “in their 
candidacy and after election to comply with the rules and provisions adopted in 
Islamic Law,” did not require female government officials to wear headscarves 
because the legislature may consider various interpretations of sharia law and 
various sources outside of sharia law in upholding the public interest and, if the 
legislature is at all bound by sharia law, it is only bound by those tenets it 
expressly adopts in legislation). 
 52. See Al-Moqatei, supra note 45, at 142 (describing the 1984 proposal to 
amend Article 2). 
 53. See discussion supra Part II. 
 54. See Al-Moqatei, supra note 45, at 141–44 (citing the arguments of the 
National Assembly members who proposed to amend Article 2, including that the 
Explanatory Note to Article 2 compelled the legislature to derive all of its laws 
from sharia). 
 55. See Ismail bin Matt, Toward an Islamic Constitutional Government in 
Sudan (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.amss.org/pdfs/35/ 
finalpapers/IsmailbinMatt.pdf (noting that thirty-one out of fifty members of 
Parliament support changes to the Constitution making sharia “the only source” of 
law in Kuwait); B. Izzak, Amir Rejects Proposal to Amend Constitution – 
Islamists’ Sharia Bid Thwarted – MP to Grill Social Affairs Minister, KUWAIT 
TIMES (May 17, 2012), http://news.kuwaittimes.net/2012/05/17/islamists-sharia-
bid-thwarted-mp-to-grill-social-affairs-minister-amir-rejects-proposal-to-amend-
constitution/ (reporting that the Amir rejected a request by Islamist members of 
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B. SUDAN  
During the 1960s, Islamists in Sudan had been pushing for the 
state to adopt an “Islamic” constitution.56 In 1968 a constituent 
assembly with Islamists in leadership positions proposed such a 
constitution. Article 113 of the proposed constitution said, “the 
principles of the Islamic Sharia are the chief source of 
legislation.”57 Clearly fearing that this clause might by itself be 
insufficient to establish the principle that all law must respect 
Islamic principles, they also included in Article 114 a provision 
stating, “Every legislation passed after the adoption of this 
constitution in contravention with the provisions of kitab and 
sunnah (i.e., Qur’an and the [hadith literature]) should be void, 
provided that such contravention did not in essence previously 
exist.”58 As a result of ongoing political turmoil and a military 
coup, this draft of the constitution was scuttled.59 Eventually in 
1973, a new president enacted a new constitution that ambiguously 
made both the Islamic sharia and custom (‘urf) simultaneously “the 
two chief sources of legislation” [al-Sharia al-Islamiyya wa’l-’urf 
masdaran ra’isian li’l-tashri’].60 Because the courts never had an 
opportunity meaningfully to construe this provision, we cannot 
 
Parliament to amend Article 79 of the Constitution to require that all laws comply 
with sharia law); Al-Rai, Islamist MPs to Go Ahead with Constitutional 
Amendments, KUWAIT TIMES (May 19, 2012), http://news.kuwaittimes.net/ 
2012/05/19/islamist-mps-to-go-ahead-with-constitutional-amendments/ (reporting 
that, in spite of the Amir’s rejection of their Article 79 amendment, Islamist 
members of Parliament will continue in pursuit of “Islamization of laws” and will 
eventually propose another Article 2 amendment). 
 56. See Ali Suleiman Fadall, Constitution Making in the Sudan, 4–6 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/ 
UNMIS/Constitution-making%20Symposium/110524_Ali%20Suleiman_paper_ 
dft2.pdf (describing Sudan’s attempts to draft an “Islamic” constitution from 
independence in 1953 until the adoption of a draft Islamic constitution in 1968). 
 57. See bin Matt, supra note 55 (citing DRAFT CONSTITUTION, 1968, art. 113 
(Sudan)) (emphasis added). 
 58. See id. (citing DRAFT CONSTITUTION, 1968, art. 114 (Sudan)). 
 59. Fadall, supra note 56, at 5–6 (recalling that the 1968 Draft Constitution was 
substantially revised before formal adoption in 1973). 
 60. See THE PERMANENT CONSTITUTION OF THE SUDAN, 1973, art. 9 (Sudan) 
available at http://www.righttononviolence.org/mecf/wp-content/uploads/1973/01/ 
1973Sudan.pdf, translated at http://www.righttononviolence.org/mecf/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/01/Constitution-Sudan-1973-+-amendment-1975.pdf. 
  
752 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:3 
speculate about how it was interpreted.61  
In the 1980s a series of military regimes in the Sudan decided to 
compensate for their lack of democratic legitimacy by reaching out 
to Islamists. They revised statutes to make them conform to Islamic 
law. In 1998, the second of these regimes drafted a new constitution 
that reflected the concern that provisions making Islamic norms “a 
chief source” or “the chief source” continued to be ambiguous on the 
key question of whether all state law would have to respect those 
norms. The 1998 Constitution, like the earlier 1968 Constitution, 
declared Islamic law to be one of “the sources” of legislation and 
then stated explicitly that no law could be inconsistent with Islamic 
law or any of these other sources.62 Importantly, the Constitution 
 
 61. This is for two reasons. First, the government enacted reforms that greatly 
limited the ability of the judiciary to exercise judicial review. See Fadall, supra 
note 56, at 6 (noting that, after another attempted military coup, the constitution 
was amended to increase the power of the president to the point that “the 
constitution became what the president thought it should be”). At the same time, 
whether or not courts thought it was required to, the military government began a 
process of radical legislative Islamization—one that obviated the need for Islamists 
to bring cases arguing that the government was acting in a manner inconsistent 
with Islam. For the process of Islamization in the Sudan, see generally 13 
CAROLYN FLUEHR-LOBBAN, ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE SUDAN (1987) 
(providing an overview of the role of Islam in Sudanese society based on 
anthropological research conducted in the 1970s); Olaf Köndgen, Sharia and 
National Law in the Sudan in SHARIA INCORPORATED: A COMPARATIVE 
OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF TWELVE MUSLIM COUNTRIES IN PAST AND 
PRESENT 181 (Jan Michiel Otto ed., 2010) (mapping the application of sharia law 
in Sudan from the sixteenth century to 2010 and arguing that, after more than 
twenty years of increasing Islamization, the threat of war with South Sudan has 
eclipsed Islamization as the government’s highest priority); AHARON LAYISH & 
GABRIEL R. WARBURG, THE REINSTATEMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW IN SUDAN UNDER 
NUMAYRI (Rudd Peters & Bernard Weiss eds., 2002) (analyzing the methods used 
by President Muhammad Ja’far Numayri to reinstate sharia law in Sudan in 1983 
and the results of this “experiment” for Sudanese society); Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, 
Islamization in Sudan: A Critical Assessment, 44 MIDDLE E.J. 610 (1990) 
(examining the parallel between the rise of Islamization in northern Sudan and the 
rise in conflict between northern Sudan and southern Sudan, culminating in both 
the imposition of sharia law and the outbreak of civil war in Sudan). 
 62. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN art. 65, translated 
in THE NAME OF GOD, THE GRACIOUS, THE MERCIFUL: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN (Max Planck Inst. for Comparative Public Law & 
International Law, 1998) (“Islamic law and the consensus of the nation, by 
referendum, Constitution and custom shall be the sources of legislation; and no 
legislation in contravention with these fundamentals shall be made; however, the 
legislation shall be guided by the nation’s public opinion, the learned opinion of 
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explicitly denied the courts the power to enforce this provision—
leaving the question of whether the law was consistent with Islam to 
be resolved by the political branches. To the best of my knowledge, 
there is no record of how the existence of the clause has affected the 
actual process of legislation. 
C. YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC 
After the overthrow of the imamic monarchy in 1962,63 the Yemen 
Arab Republic imposed a series of temporary constitutions, many of 
which proposed Islam as the only source of law and at least one of 
which contained an explicit repugnancy clause requiring that no law 
contravene sharia principles.64 In 1970, however, Yemen finally 
formed a constituent assembly that was tasked with the job of 
drafting a new constitution that reflected the popular will. As they 
carried out their work, the drafters debated the role of Islam. 
Interestingly, it appears that younger politicians who were 
considered relatively secular suggested that sharia be made merely 
“the chief source of legislation” on the grounds that this would allow 
the state to enact laws that were not drawn from fiqh.65 It is unclear 
whether they thought such a provision would permit governments to 
adopt laws that were inconsistent with the narrower range of 
principles that Islamic modernists would recognize as the essential 
principles of sharia. In response, hard-line Islamists demanded 
successfully that the 1970 Constitution make Islam “the source of all 
legislations” (al-sharia al-islamiyya masdar jami’ al-tashri’at).66 
This language was included in Article 3 and in the 1991 Constitution 
that is currently in force.67  
 
scholars and thinkers, and then by the decision of those in charge of public 
affairs.”). 
 63. See generally PAUL DRESCH, A HISTORY OF MODERN YEMEN 89–119 
(2000) (providing a history of Yemen and a discussion of the overthrow of the 
Imamic regime). 
 64. See Al-Tayib Zain al-Abidin, The Role of Islam in the State: Yemen Arab 
Republic 1940–1972, 108–14 (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge 
University) (on file with author). 
 65. See id. at 118. 
 66. PERMANENT CONSTITUTION OF THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC, Dec. 28, 
1970, art. 3, translated in Translation: Constitution of the Yemen Arab Republic, 
25 MIDDLE E. J. 389 (1971). 
 67. Id. 
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More scholarship needs to be done into the courts’ interpretation 
and application of Yemen’s SSL clause. The clause is embedded in a 
constitution that indicates through all sorts of other provisions a 
desire to create a justiciable requirement that law respect sharia 
principles as understood by Islamic scholars.68 Published reports 
confirm that the court does, in fact, review laws for consistency with 
Islamic principles.69 There has been no systematic study, however, of 
its case law. More studies would need to be undertaken before we 
could speak with any confidence about the method that the courts are 
using.  
D. EGYPT  
Egyptian legal advisors assisted in the drafting of many of the 
Arab constitutions that made sharia norms a chief source of 
legislation. Ironically, Egypt itself came late to the ranks of countries 
that adopted a sharia source-of-law clause. Egypt’s 1923 
Constitution made Islam the religion of the state, but it did not 
declare Islamic law a “source” of legislation.70 In 1952, a military 
coup led to the dissolution of the 1923 Constitution.71 For almost 
thirty years thereafter, a government led by Jamal Abd al-Nasir 
governed Egypt under a series of temporary constitutions that did not 
 
 68. See id. (highlighting the fact that Article 8 insists that fundamental rights 
shall be only be interpreted and enforced as permitted by sharia and by legislation; 
that Article 79 requires the heads of the executive branch to swear before the 
parliament that they will respect God and his law; that Article 155 declares that all 
the members of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall be “Shari’ah scholars of 
high qualifications”; and that Article 156 requires judges to swear before 
parliament that they will follow the book of God and the law of his Prophet). See 
generally BROWN, supra note 10, at 87–89. 
 69. See generally Chibli Mallat, Recent Judgments from the Yemen Supreme 
Court, 2 ISLAMIC L. J. 71 (1995) (describing a particular case where the court used 
a method of reasoning that included reviewing the laws for consistency with 
Islamic principles). 
 70. See Mohamed Abdelaal, Religious Constitutionalism in Egypt: A Case 
Study, 37 THE FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 35, 36 (2013) (noting that, while 
Article 149 of Egypt’s 1923 Constitution inserted Islam as the religion of the state, 
Islamic law was not inserted as a source of legislation until President Mohamad 
Anwar el-Sadat assumed power in 1970 and proposed to add the phrase into the 
Permanent Egyptian Constitution of 1971). 
 71. See Kristin A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi 
Legal System, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 695, 722 (2004) (recounting that the 
current constitution of Egypt is its fourth constitution since the 1952 military coup 
that ended the monarchy and dissolved the 1923 Constitution). 
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include an SSL clause.  
By the late 1960s, however, Nasir’s government had begun to face 
serious popular discontent, including discontent from Islamists.72 
After the death of President Nasir in 1971, Egypt’s new president, 
Anwar Sadat, decided to draft a new constitution that would reach 
out to a wide variety of constituencies in Egypt, including Islamists.73 
In appealing to Islamists, Egypt’s constituent assembly decided to 
adopt an SSL clause.  
Bruce Rutherford, who did exhaustive work on the drafting of the 
Constitution, reports that the decision to adopt an SSL clause was 
uncontroversial.74 A member of the Constitutional Drafting 
Committee proposed to include a provision stating, “the principles of 
the Islamic sharia are a chief source of legislation.” He added that 
such language was consistent with Article 1 of Sanhuri’s 1949 Civil 
Code and was similar to constitutional provisions that had already 
been incorporated into the constitutions of other countries.75 The SSL 
clause was adopted without any further discussion.76  
Interestingly, when the draft was made public, a public discussion 
erupted about the choice of wording—one that would shape Egyptian 
views about the meaning of SSL clauses and ultimately would shape 
views around the Arab world. The debate began when someone 
wrote a letter to the editor arguing that it would be preferable to say 
that the principles of Islamic sharia were “the” rather than “a chief 
source of legislation.”77 A leading member of the committee felt 
obliged to respond. He argued that this would limit the flexibility of 
the legislature and force it to legislate in accordance with classically 
 
 72. Clark B. Lombardi, The Constitution as Agreement to Agree: The Social 
and Political Foundations (and Effects) of the 1971 Egyptian Constitution, in THE 
SOCIO-POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS (Dennis Galligan & Mila 
Versteeg eds., forthcoming 2013). 
 73. Bruce Rutherford, The Struggle for Constitutionalism in Egypt: 
Understanding the Obstacles to Democratic Transition in the Arab World 246–48 
(1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (providing details on the 
involvement of several members of the Islamic religious establishment on the 
committee responsible for drafting the new constitution, including their attempts to 
get elements of Islamic constitutionalism in the new constitution). 
 74. Id. at 249–50. 
 75. Id. at 249. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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trained ‘ulama.78 This argument would seem to overstate in many 
ways the importance of the proposed change. The experience of 
Syria, Sudan, and Yemen makes clear that a clause making Islam 
“the chief source of legislation” could plausibly be interpreted not to 
create a justiciable requirement that all state law conform to sharia 
norms.79 Furthermore, most Egyptians who wanted the constitution 
to create a justiciable requirement that the law respect sharia 
principles were modernists who did not necessarily expect courts to 
rely on the fuqaha’s interpretation of sharia and indeed most likely 
expected lay judges to interpret and apply the principles themselves 
using modernist methods of reasoning.80 
Whatever the shortcomings of this response, it inspired a new raft 
of letters to the editor in major Egyptian newspapers.81 The ensuing 
debate seems to have nurtured a popular perception among Egyptians 
that a provision making sharia “a” chief source of legislation did not 
create a justiciable requirement that legislation conform to sharia 
 
 78. See Joseph P. O’Kane, Islam in the New Egyptian Constitution: Some 
Discussions in “al-Ahram,” 26 MIDDLE E. J. 137, 141 (1972) (relaying the 
committee members’ opinion that, similar to Kuwait’s constitution, recognizing 
“shar[ia] as a principal source of legislation” allows legislators to adapt to 
changing circumstances in society if need be by allowing them to reference sources 
other than sharia while still generally imposing an Islamic orientation); see also 
Rutherford, supra note 73, at 250 (arguing that making sharia the sole source of 
legislation would impose unacceptable restrictions on legislators especially 
regarding the economy and personal status legislation). See generally CLARK B. 
LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT (Rudd Peters & 
Bernard Weiss eds., 2006) (using the example of Egypt’s inclusion of an SSL 
clause in Article 2 of its 1971 Constitution to discuss the effect that “constitutional 
Islamization” has on the legal system already in place and attempts by a country to 
modernize, particularly in terms of human rights or financial legal issues). 
 79. See discussion supra Parts II, III(B), (C). 
 80. See generally LOMBARDI, supra note 78, at 117–18. 
 81. See O’Kane, supra note 78, at 138 (dividing the positions taken by the 
authors of the letters into three categories: those who wanted to see Islam declared 
the state religion; those requesting that Islam at least be recognized as a source of 
legislation, if not the only source; and those seeking an improvement in the status 
of women and the modernization of laws regarding marriage and family life). 
Compare LOMBARDI, supra note 78, at 117–18 (analyzing the debate of whether 
sharia should be “a” source of legislation versus “the” source of legislation), with 
Rutherford, supra note 73, at 250 (providing details of the position held by the 
most influential member of the constitutional drafting committee and his belief that 
making sharia the source of legislation would severely hamper the ability of the 
legislators to create laws helping Egypt on its path toward democratic 
government). 
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principles, whereas a provision making sharia “the chief source” of 
legislation would create such a requirement. Thus, as Islamism grew 
in Egypt during the 1970s, Islamists sought to amend the 
Constitution to make the principles of the Islamic sharia the chief 
source of Egyptian legislation—fully expecting such a provision to 
be interpreted as one that would require courts to void any law 
inconsistent with sharia.  
In 1980, in an attempt to reach out to Islamists, the Egyptian 
government decided to signal a new commitment to ensuring that its 
legislation was consistent with Islam. To signal this commitment, it 
amended Article 2 of the Constitution and made the principles of the 
sharia “the chief source of legislation.” At roughly the same time, a 
new constitutional court was established, and in a seminal 1985 
ruling, the new court held that Article 2 as amended created a 
partially justiciable requirement that law conform to Islamic 
principles.82 Challenges to the Islamicness of legislation enacted 
prior to 1980 were non-justiciable, while challenges to legislation 
enacted thereafter were not. The court thereafter began to perform 
Islamic review of new legislation. In subsequent years, the court 
developed the Arab world’s most expansive body of Islamic review 
jurisprudence. This jurisprudence made clear that the constitution did 
not require the government to legislate in line with the ulama’s 
interpretation of Islamic law; rather, it only had to legislate in line 
with universal principles identified through a modernist-inspired 
method of interpretation—one that clearly drew heavily on the work 
of thinkers like Rashid Rida and Sanhuri.83 The state was thus 
constrained by only a limited number of rules and principles, most of 
which were quite general. Among them was a principle that the state 
had to act in the public interest. In applying this theory, it left the 
legislature considerable discretion to act in the public interest. To the 
 
 82. See Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring 
Adherence to Shari’a Threaten Human Rights? How Egypt’s Constitutional Court 
Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of law, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 379, 
392 (2005) (describing the court’s 1985 ruling that resolved the threshold question 
of justiciability as “politically ingenious” by holding that the SCC had jurisdiction 
to hear challenges to legislation enacted after Article 2 was adopted). 
 83. See LOMBARDI, supra note 78, at 118–19; Lombardi & Brown, supra note 
82, at 393 n.34 (discussing the similarity in thought between Rashid Rida and 
Sanhani regarding how Islamic legislation should be checked against universal 
aspects of Islamic law that promote social utility). 
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extent that Islam restrained the state, the court found that it did so in 
a way that was consistent with liberal values—a development that 
allowed Egyptians as a whole to grow comfortable with the idea of 
Islamic review, but left some political Islamists unsatisfied.  
E. UAE (1971) 
Egypt was not the only country to adopt a constitution in 1971 
with an SSL clause. Article 7 of the United Arab Emirates’ 
(“UAE’s”) 1971 Constitution, which is still in force, says that sharia 
shall be “a chief source of legislation.” At the time this clause was 
drafted, people in many countries believed such a provision was 
insufficient, by itself, to create a justiciable requirement that 
legislation conform to sharia norms. In the UAE, however, this 
provision has been read in light of other constitutional provisions and 
in light of state practice. As such, it has been interpreted arguably, 
though not definitively, to create such a requirement.  
A number of emirates in the Gulf asked Sanhuri in 1969 to draft a 
constitution for a proposed new federation to be called the United 
Arab Emirates.84 After accepting and beginning, illness prevented the 
aging Sanhuri from continuing. The task of drafting thus fell to Dr. 
Wahid al-Ra’fat, an expert on the Kuwaiti legal system, on the 
understanding that his proposal would be reviewed by a committee 
of experts.85  
Some UAE citizens wanted the constitution to contain an SSL 
clause exactly like Article 2 of the Kuwaiti Constitution, which, as 
we have seen, made sharia “a” chief source of legislation. Islamists, 
however, pressured the court to make Islamic sharia the only source 
of legislation—for which Islamists in Kuwait had also been pushing. 
As a compromise, Dr. Ra’fat initially proposed making the Islamic 
 
 84. See Hadif al-Rashid al-Owais, The Role of the Supreme Court in the 
Constitutional System of the United Arab Emirates: A Comparative Study 50–51 
(1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Durham), available at 
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/786/ (stating that the first resolution of the first successful 
meeting of the Supreme Council declared that Sanhuri should be entrusted with 
drafting the “full and permanent charter of the Union”). 
 85. See id. at 51–52 (noting that, although Dr. Ra’fat was originally selected to 
review the draft of the constitution produced by the legal experts, he eventually 
decided it was necessary to draft a complete revision of his own rather than just 
commenting on the legal experts’ draft). 
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sharia the chief source of legislation.86 This wording would clarify, 
he thought, that the UAE would operate in the manner that the 
Sanhuri codes proposed: legislators would be required to respect 
general principles of Islamic law that had been deduced from the 
various interpretations of Islamic law that had been proposed over 
the centuries. When determining what specific rules to adopt, 
however, legislators would be able to draw from any number of 
sources—including European civil and commercial codes.87 In the 
UAE as in Egypt, however, some apparently worried that people 
reading a clause making sharia “the chief source of legislation” 
might interpret this as a law requiring the government to codify and 
apply traditional fiqh rules. (That this fear should be shared in the 
two countries must surely reflect the influence in both countries of a 
cadre of Egyptian jurists.) Ultimately, the committee chose not to 
make sharia “the chief source of legislation.” Instead, it followed the 
Kuwaiti constitution. Article 7 of the UAE Constitution said, “The 
Islamic Sharia is a chief source of legislation” (al-Sharia al-
Islamiyya masdarun raisiun li’l tashri’).  
After the adoption of the UAE constitution, some argued that, 
notwithstanding its relatively mild language, Article 7 required 
legislators to legislate in accordance with sharia and required judges 
to void legislation that did not conform to sharia.88 Intriguingly, as 
 
 86. See Wahid al-Ra’fat, Op-Ed, Wafd Party Figure Protests Misinterpretation 
on Islamic law, AKHIR SA’AH (Egypt), May 18, 1984, at No. 2581, translated in 
NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT 6–7 (Joint Publications Research Serv., 1984), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTR 
Doc.pdf&AD=ADA338094 (quoting his own memorandum, which read, “One of 
the provisions which the amendment deals with is the stipulation in Article Four of 
the draft permanent constitution, that Islamic law is the main source of legislation, 
in place of the expression ‘Islamic law is a main source of legislation’ as stated in 
Article Seven of the temporary constitution,” and continuing to note that “[t]his 
latter statement puts Islamic law on an equal footing with other sources of 
legislation . . . which is the contrary of what would have been the case had it said 
‘Islamic law is the only source of legislation’ . . . [i]t was considered that that 
should not be adopted, in defense against the suspicion of fanaticism or extremism 
which conflicts with our tolerant Islamic law, which is open to all new things as 
long as they do not conflict with its principles and its valid provisions”). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Butti Sultan Ali al-Muhairi, The Position of Shari’a Within the UAE 
Constitution and the Federal Supreme Court’s Application of the Constitutional 
Clause Concerning Shari’a, 11 ARAB L.Q. 219, 226–31 (1996) (explaining that 
observers fall into two camps, Liberal and Islamist, with the latter arguing that a 
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the new state began to operate under the 1971 Constitution, the 
government behaved in a manner that suggested agreement with the 
idea that the state is required to respect at least the core principles of 
Islamic law. Most important, the government in 1978 enacted 
legislation instructing the Supreme Court, when exercising cassation 
jurisdiction over court decisions, to treat as void legislation that did 
not “conform to the Islamic Sharia.”89 
In such an environment, the courts began to exercise Islamic 
review. It remains unclear whether they do so only because the 
UAE’s statutes require such action or whether they might do so in 
the absence of a statute—on the ground that the Constitution’s SSL 
clause requires them to do so. In the 1985 Junatta Bank case, the 
UAE’s highest court followed the view of Egypt’s Supreme 
Constitutional Court in 1985.90 It held that it could not strike down 
laws permitting interest because the laws were enacted prior to 
1978.91 Nevertheless, the court declared that, with respect to all new 
government actions and new laws, the courts must treat as void any 
law that the court finds to be inconsistent with the general principles 
of sharia.  
Subsequently, courts have consistently examined laws enacted 
after 1978 for consistency with the general principles of Islam and 
have treated non-conforming laws as void. Interestingly, the 
jurisprudence suggests that courts void un-Islamic legislation not 
merely because Law No. 10/1973, Article 33 instructs them to do so, 
but because Article 7 of the Constitution requires them to do so. A 
series of Supreme Court cases from the early 1980s appear to hold 
that Article 75 of Law No. 10/1973 reflects the original 
 
law is unconstitutional when it violates the sharia). 
 89. Id. at 232. 
 90. See discussion supra Part III(D) (providing that Egypt’s new court ruled 
that the SSL provision in Egypt’s constitution created only a partially justiciable 
requirement that new laws conform with Islamic law); see also al-Muhairi, supra 
note 88, at 235–37 (describing the decision of the UAE court that found the SSL 
provision of UAE’s constitution to also be only a partially justiciable requirement 
that new laws conform with Islamic law). 
 91. See al-Muhairi, supra note 88, at 235–37 (noting that laws passed before 
the new constitution became operable in 1978 remained in force as long as no 
amendment occurred and they were not expressly abolished); cf. Omer Eltom, The 
Emirates Law in Practice: Case Law Study, 100 LEGAL ISSUES 5 (2009) 
(discussing later cases). 
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understanding of what Article 7 required.92 Two leading scholars of 
the UAE legal system paraphrase the holdings in the last of these 
cases as follows: 
[A]lthough it may appear from Article 7 of the Constitution that Shari’a is 
to be on equal terms with other sources of Law because it is referred to as 
“a main source” instead of “the main source” of Law, the doubt has been 
removed by Article 75 in which the legislature has explained the intention 
from Article 7 of the Constitution that Shari’a is to have a paramount 
position that makes it prevail over other sources of law. . . . [T]he 
jurisprudential disputes over the interpretation of the said Constitutional 
Clause which exist in another country, was not envisaged in the UAE, 
especially after the promulgation of Article 75.93 
In short, even if Article 75 was repealed, courts might interpret 
Article 7 of the Constitution to say that they still have to strike down 
newly enacted legislation that is inconsistent with the essential 
principles of Islam.  
F. QATAR 
The Emirate of Qatar was at one point expected to join the United 
Arab Emirates.94 Ultimately, it decided not to join and, instead, to 
become an independent nation.95 In 1972 it drafted a provisional 
Constitution of 1972, Article 7 of which said, “. . . the Islamic Sharia 
is the chief source of its legislation” (al-Sharia al-Islamiyya al-
masdar al-raisi li’l tashri’ha’).96 As Ballantyne noted, the 1972 
 
 92. See Case No.1, Year 8 (1982) published in 100 UAE OFFICIAL GAZETTE 
45–49 (1982);), Case No.1, Year 10 (1983) published in 129 UAE OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE 102–07 (1984); and Case No.4, Year 9 (1984) published in 135 UAE 
OFFICIAL GAZETTE 83–93 (1984); see also al-Owais, supra note 84, at 346–51 
(explaining that Article 7 requires that sharia be given paramount consideration 
compared to other sources of law); al-Muhairi, supra note 88, at 239–43 (providing 
that Case No. 1/Year 8 was the first time the UAE Supreme Court announced that 
measures that fail to comply with sharia would be disregarded). 
 93. See al-Muhairi, supra note 88, at 242 (discussing Case 4, Year 9 (1984)). 
 94. See Ballantyne, supra note 42, at 158 (noting that until a late stage Qatar 
and Bahrain were planned to be part of the United Arab Emirates until protracted 
negotiations interfered with this intended result). 
 95. Id. at 158. 
 96. Al Jaridah al Rasmiyah (Qatar Official Gazette) No. 5, 22 April 1972; see 
W.M. Ballantyne, The States of the GCC: Sources of Law, the Shari’a and the 
Extent to Which It Applies, 1 ARAB L.Q. 3, 9 (1985-86) (stating that the Qatari 
Constitution prescribes sharia as the main source of law, which is a much stronger 
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Constitution was unusually autocratic, even by the minimalist 
democratic standards of the Gulf region.97 The 1972 Constitution 
thus lacked a provision for judicial review of legislation.98 Indeed, in 
1997, Nathan Brown reported that after extensive research in the 
region, “not a single Qatari judge or lawyer could name one case in 
the history of the courts that had a constitutional dimension.”99 In 
such an environment, Article 7 obviously did not create a justiciable 
requirement of state respect for Islamic law because no constitutional 
question was justiciable. In the 2000s, a cautious program of 
constitutional reform began. In 2004, Qatar adopted a new 
constitution, and by 2008 a constitutional court with the power of 
judicial review was finally created.100 
Strikingly, the 2004 Qatari Constitution demoted the role of 
sharia from “the” to “a” chief source of legislation.101 This 
probably does not reflect a changing view of the government’s 
obligations. More likely, it reflects the fact that, between 1971 and 
2004, Arabs were coming to understand SSL clauses making 
sharia “the chief source” of legislation differently than they had in 
1972. In 1972, these clauses were considered ambiguous. It was 
not at all clear that they barred a state from enacting laws 
 
declaration than in other constitutions of nearby states); see also Ahmed al-
Suwaidi, Developments of the Legal Systems of the Gulf Arab States, 8 ARAB L.Q. 
289, 296 (1993) (explaining that Article 7 of Qatar’s first Provisional Constitution 
was replaced by the Amended Provisional Constitution of 1972, which in Article 7 
declares that “the religion of the State is Al-Islam” and that the “Islamic Shari’a is 
the principle source for its legislation”). Published in al-Jaridah al-Rasmiyah 
(Qatar Official Gazette) No. 5, 22 April 1972. Ballantyne and Suwaidi each report 
that the constitution makes sharia, “THE chief source of its legislation.” See 
Ballantyne, supra, at 9; al-Suwaidi, supra, at 296. 
 97. See Ballantyne, supra note 42, at 161–62 (translating and interpreting 
several articles of the 1972 Constitution to illustrate its autocratic nature). 
 98. See Jill Crystal, COUNTRIES AT THE CROSSROADS 2004 - QATAR (2004), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/473868f264.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2013) 
(claiming that a judicial agency has not been established for judicial review even 
though Article 140 of the Constitution states, “the law shall define the judicial 
agency that is authorized to settle disputes related to constitutional validity of laws 
and regulations”). 
 99. BROWN, supra note 10, at 183 n.66. 
 100. See United Nations Development Programme, Program on Governance in 
the Arab Region (POGAR), Judiciary: Qatar, http://www.undp-pogar.org/ 
countries/theme.aspx?t=9&cid=15 (last visited June 10, 2012). 
 101. Dustur [Constitution] July 13, 1999 (Qatar), translated at 
http://www.mofa.gov.qa/details.cfm?id=206 (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
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inconsistent with sharia. Furthermore, there was no judicial 
review. Thus, the Qatari government, when it drafted a 
constitution with this type of SSL clause, did not think it was 
committing itself to legislate in accordance with sharia—and 
certainly not to legislate in accordance with an independent 
court’s interpretation of sharia. By 2004, however, discourse in 
Egypt and elsewhere had convinced most Arabs that SSL clauses 
making sharia “the chief source” of legislation did commit the 
state to legislate in accordance with sharia, and a court stood 
ready to enforce this provision.  
Against this backdrop, Ballantyne plausibly suggests that the 
drafters of the Qatari constitution wanted to indicate that Qatari 
judges, unlike their Egyptian counterparts, had no power to strike 
down legislation inconsistent with sharia norms.102 If that was 
their goal, it remains to be seen whether courts will nevertheless 
assert the power of Islamic review. UAE jurisprudence suggests 
that they could, in theory, argue that under certain circumstances, 
an SSL clause making Islamic law “a chief source” of legislation 
can give courts the power of judicial review. The circumstances 
that led UAE courts to assert the power of Islamic review are not 
present in Qatar and, to date, the Qatari courts have not asserted 
this power.  
G. BAHRAIN 
Like Qatar, Bahrain considered joining the United Arab Emirates. 
When it finally decided not to do so, it drafted its own constitution. 
Article 2 of Bahrain’s 1973 Constitution says, “Islamic Sharia is a 
chief source of legislation.”103 Article 2 of the 2002 Constitution 
repeats this language.104 
 
 102. See Ballantyne, supra note 36, at 4. 
 103. CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN Sept. 6, 1971, art. 2 (emphasis 
added), available at http://www.bahrain.bh/pubportal/wps/wcm/connect/ 
ae5e35804b96f82b80808713d8048f0c/bhDostoor1973.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. 
 104. CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF BAHRAIN Feb. 14, 2002 (as amended 
through June 2012), available at http://www.shura.bh/LegislativeResource/ 
Constitution/Pages/default.aspx. Unfortunately, I am not aware of any study that 
focuses on the drafting of this provision or on the way it has been interpreted. 
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H. IRAQ 
After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraqis drafted a series of new 
constitutions. The debates about the role of Islam tell us much about 
the way in which SSL language had by that time come to be 
understood. Iraq’s new constitutions did, ultimately, adopt 
idiosyncratically worded SSL clauses.  
After the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the government hastily 
drafted, without significant public input, a Transitional 
Administrative Law (“TAL”), which functioned as a temporary 
constitution.105 The TAL had somewhat idiosyncratic provisions. 
Instead of referring to sharia norms as “a” or “the” chief source of 
legislation, Article 7 of the TAL said that Islam itself “is to be 
considered a source of legislation” (yu’id masdar al-tashri’). It 
continued to say, “It shall not be permitted to enact a law conflicting 
with the settled tenets of Islam that have been agreed through 
consensus” (la yajuz sann qanun yata’arrad ma’ thawabit al-Islam 
al-mujma’ ‘alayha). As Intisar Rabb has pointed out, the SSL 
provision was unique among Arab constitutions and was, in fact, 
extremely unclear.106  
Thereafter, the Transitional Administration tasked a constituent 
assembly, which was supposed to be broadly representative of Iraq’s 
diverse population, with the job of drafting a constitution that would 
be widely acceptable to the Iraqi people. There was also an implicit 
understanding that the draft constitution would have to be acceptable 
to the occupying forces as well. The new constitution was to include 
its SSL provision in Article 2. According to U.S. officials stationed 
at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq during the drafting period, participants 
debated the wording of this provision.107 Their published account of 
 
 105. See Intisar A. Rabb, “We the Jurists”: Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 
10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 527, 539 n.24 (2008) (citing the Law of Administration for 
the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period). 
 106. See generally id. at 539–41 (2008) (pointing out that the precise meaning of 
Islamic constitutionalism in Iraq will not be clear until the government shows what 
form it will give the terms “Islam” and “settled Islamic (legal) rules”). 
 107. See generally Deeks & Burton, supra note 3, at 5–6 (recounting that 
debates regarding the wording of the sharia provision were among some of the 
most contentious of the entire constitution-writing process, not so much due to 
substantive disagreements, but more due to different interpretations of Islam 
  
2013] SHARIA: “A” OR “THE” CHIEF SOURCE OF LEGISLATION 765 
the negotiations tells us much about the evolution of popular 
understanding about the implications of SSL clauses among Arabs 
and non-Arabs alike. Negotiators from powerful Shiite Islamic 
parties wanted the new provision to describe some set of sharia 
norms as “the chief source of legislation.” Echoing the position 
imputed in this paper to the drafters of the 2004 Qatari Constitution, 
participants associated with secular parties argued against this. They 
complained that such a provision would create a justiciable 
requirement that law respect those norms. With the strong support of 
U.S. officials, they succeeded in getting the provision to say instead 
that Islam rather than sharia would be recognized as a “basic source 
of legislation” (masdar asas li’l tashri’).108 Having won the battle, 
however, they lost the war. Article 2 went on specifically to note, 
“Enacting a law conflicting with the settled rulings of Islam is not 
permitted.”109 This addition would seem to accomplish exactly what 
the secularists had wanted to avoid. It created a justiciable 
requirement that law conform to a subset of sharia norms. So long as 
a judge could (a) determine what the constitution means when it 
refers to the “settled rulings of Islam,” or “thawabit ahkam al-Islam,” 
which is not a common phrase in Islamic thought and (b) carry out 
the Islamic legal interpretation necessary to determine whether a law 
contravened these settled rulings of Islam, then the court should be 
able to exercise Islamic review of legislation. 
Given this clear textual provision authorizing judicial review, it is 
fascinating that the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq seems recently to 
have decided not to carry out Islamic review. After a 2010 case in 
which the court appeared ready to perform Islamic review,110 the 
 
among different people). 
 108. See id. at 7–10 (reporting that the approved draft used the term “masdar 
asasi,” meaning “basic source,” which differed from the version that was presented 
for approval, which included the term “masdar asas,” meaning “foundation 
source,” for unexplained reasons, perhaps even just a drafting error). But see Rabb, 
supra note 105, at 539 (translating “masdar asas” as “basic source,” suggesting 
that there is no real difference between the two terms and they both translate to 
“basic source”). Agreeing with Rabb about the proper translation, I translate it as 
“basic source.” 
 109. See Deeks & Burton, supra note 3, at 7 (citing Article 2(A) as stating, “No 
law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be enacted”). 
 110. Federal Supreme Court of Iraq, decision No. 60 of December 21, 2010, 
available at http://www.iraqja.iq/view.738/. See generally Haider al-Hamoudi, 
Religion and Law in Iraq: A Noteworthy Federal Supreme Court Opinion, JURIST 
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justices backtracked. In two cases decided over the past two years, 
the court appears to have taken the position that the question of 
whether a law violates the constitutional command to respect the 
settled rulings of Islam is a political question. It can only be resolved 
confidently by a legislature with access to expert advisors.111  
The courts of Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen have 
all declared themselves competent to determine, on their own, 
whether new state legislation is consistent with sharia norms (or, 
more precisely, with those sharia norms that their respective 
constitutions have made non-controvertible). The courts have thus 
performed what might be described as a form of Islamic review. The 
Iraqi Federal Supreme Court’s apparent decision to avoid performing 
Islamic review on the grounds that it is ill-equipped to do so is 
unusual. It is likely due to a confluence of factors that exist in Iraq 
but not in other countries. First, Iraq is a majority Shi’ite country. 
Although a majority of Sunnis in majority Sunni countries like Egypt 
and the UAE appear to reject the idea that the traditionally trained 
fuqaha’ have unique authority to interpret God’s law, a majority of 
Shi’ites in Iraq may continue to believe that traditional training is a 
prerequisite to Islamic interpretive authority and thus may not 
respect the interpretation of Islamic law developed by a court whose 
judges are not traditionally trained.112 Second, notwithstanding this 
 
(Feb. 10, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/02/religion-and-law-in-iraq-a-
noteworthy-federal-supreme-court-opinion.php (describing how the court showed 
itself willing to challenge the views of the Iraqi clerics in interpreting Islamic law, 
but suggesting that doing so would be much more dangerous on issues outside of 
commerce, such as women’s right to divorce, for example). 
 111. See Federal Supreme Court of Iraq, decision No. 61 of January 31, 2012, 
available at http://www.iraqja.iq/viewd.933/; Federal Supreme Court of Iraq, 
decision No. 59 of November 21, 2011, available at http://www.iraqja.iq/ 
viewd.886/; Haider al-Hamoudi, Judicial Review of Islamic law Under Iraq’s 
Constitution, JURIST (Apr. 26, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/04/haider-
hamoudi-iraq-islam.php. 
 112. See, e.g., CHIBLI MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW: MUHAMMAD 
BAQAR AS-SADR, NAJAF AND THE SHI’A INTERNATIONAL 38 (Roger Owen ed., 
1993) (describing how muqallids, or laymen, are devoid of knowledge of the fiqh 
and, therefore, their acts are usually considered void unless they act in accordance 
with a fatwa or a recognized mujtahid, or person with proper training in the fiqh); 
Rabb, supra note 105, at 550–55 (commenting on Resolution 137, which would 
have put family law issues firmly in the hold of Islamic jurists, and suggesting that 
some supported the resolution because existing codified law was “not the output of 
a proper Islamic legal interpretive process”). 
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fact, most judges do not have traditional training.113 The Supreme 
Court may well worry that rulings on questions of Islamic law, and 
particularly Shiite Islamic law, will not be respected.  
IV. SSL CLAUSES TODAY: WHAT DO THEY 
MEAN? DO THEY MATTER? 
The history of SSL clauses that is recounted above suggests that 
the conventional wisdom about SSL clauses should be refined. 
Conventional wisdom holds that constitutions with SSL clauses 
making sharia “the chief source of legislation” create a constitutional 
obligation that all state legislation be measured against Islamic legal 
norms; others do not. Furthermore, it suggests that when a country 
adopts a constitution that requires state respect for Islamic law, this 
creates a barrier to the rule of law. The historical survey of SSL 
clauses above suggests that there is a kernel of truth in the 
conventional wisdom, but also that the conventional wisdom still 
needs to be revised in significant ways.  
To begin, there may not be as rigid a distinction as people think 
between SSL clauses that make sharia “the chief” or “the only” 
source of legislation and those that make sharia merely one chief 
source among many. When SSL clauses first appeared in 1950, and 
for almost two decades thereafter, they were understood to be 
ambiguous on the key question of whether the legislation 
inconsistent with sharia was void. Courts interpreted each SSL clause 
in light of the circumstances in which they were adopted and in light 
of the broader constitutional and legislative scheme into which the 
clauses were embedded.114  
Early SSL clauses were interpreted in ways that were inconsistent 
with the conventional wisdom that SSL clauses making sharia “the 
chief source” of legislation are the only clauses that require states to 
legislate in accordance with sharia. In the 1950s and ’60s, some 
strong SSL clauses making sharia “the chief source of legislation” 
seem not to have been read as requiring all state legislation to respect 
 
 113. Al-Hamoudi, supra note 110 (highlighting the court’s lack of authority to 
challenge the jurists on matters of sharia as family law). 
 114. In at least one case, courts also drew insight from a pattern of state practice 
that indicated, to the courts, that the government understood the SSL clause to 
prohibit legislation inconsistent with sharia. 
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sharia.115 On the other hand, in the UAE, courts concluded that in 
adopting an SSL clause making sharia merely “a chief source of 
legislation,” the Emirati government had promised not to enact 
legislation inconsistent with sharia.116 Since the 1970s, however, 
Arab understanding of these clauses seems to have evolved and now 
corresponds, in part, to the conventional wisdom. Today, most 
importantly, Arab academics and the public at large increasingly 
embrace the idea that SSL clauses making sharia “the” chief source 
of legislation are best interpreted to prohibit un-Islamic legislation.117 
If, today, an Arab government adopts a new constitution including an 
SSL clause that makes Islamic norms “the” chief source of 
legislation (or revises a constitution to include such a phrase), courts 
will most likely assume that drafters intended the provision to require 
that the state always respect those norms. Thus far, the conventional 
wisdom seems to correspond with contemporary reality. It is not 
clear, however, that a clear consensus has yet emerged about the 
implications of a government’s decision not to enact a strong SSL 
clause and instead to enact a weaker clause making sharia merely “a” 
chief source of legislation.  
It might seem logical to assume that a decision to adopt an SSL 
clause making sharia something less than “the chief source” indicates 
an intention not to be bound by any firm prohibition on legislation 
inconsistent with sharia. Indeed, some governments seem to be 
counting on courts to adopt this position.118 It is not absolutely 
certain, however, that governments will actually be able to insulate 
themselves from Islamic review simply by favoring constitutional 
language that makes sharia merely “a” rather than “the” chief source 
of legislation.  
 
 115. Syria’s 1950 Constitution and Sudan’s (never-enacted) draft Islamic 
constitution of 1968 each contained a provision making Islamic norms “the chief 
source” of legislation, but neither seems to have been understood as a provision 
barring legislation that was inconsistent with these norms. See discussion supra 
Parts I, II, III(B). 
 116. See discussion supra Part III(E). 
 117. See discussion supra introduction. 
 118. As noted above, Syria and Qatar each appear to be afraid that their 
constitutional judiciaries will interpret sharia in a manner that is inconsistent with 
that of the political branches and might thus be inclined to strike down legislation. 
To limit the likelihood of this happening, they have amended their SSL clauses to 
make Islamic law today merely “a chief source of legislation,” rather than “the 
chief source,” as it was before. See discussion supra Parts II, III(F). 
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SSL clauses are interpreted contextually. Going forward, SSL 
clauses making sharia “a chief source” of legislation will be situated 
in constitutions that make Islam the official religion of the state and 
may contain provisions instructing courts to permit regulations that 
are necessary to preserve morality or public order—words that can 
be read, if one wants to, as a proxy for Islamic legal values. These 
factors create opportunities for courts, if they are so inclined, to 
follow the lead of the UAE courts and interpret a clause making 
Islamic law merely “a chief source” to require the state to respect 
Islamic law and also to respect all other chief sources of 
legislation.119 While this seems unlikely in the short term, there 
continues to be a strong trend toward increased piety in the Muslim 
world, and the political power of the Islamic political factions 
appears to be growing. Courts may increasingly be staffed by judges 
who have Islamist sympathies or who may feel pressure to increase 
their legitimacy in the eyes of an Islamizing public, or they may 
simply wish to reinforce their power by adding a new ground for 
judicial review. It seems unwise categorically to preclude the 
possibility that down the line courts will interpret at least some weak 
SSL clauses to require that legislation be measured for consistency 
with Islamic values.  
This brings us to the important question: Does it really matter if an 
SSL clause is interpreted to require state law to respect sharia? As 
noted, it is commonly assumed that it does matter. Policy makers and 
journalists seem to believe that, if Arab courts review state law for 
consistency with Islamic norms, they are likely to void legislation 
that contravenes classical interpretations of Islamic law. In the 
process, they will strike down important laws reflecting liberal 
commitments to equality and individual rights. (Some worry as well 
that it will cause them to strike down laws essential to the 
functioning of a modern economy).120 However, if we look at the 
 
 119. Alternatively, they may, like courts in the UAE, argue that other factors—
particularly the state’s conduct after the adoption of the clause—suggested that the 
clause might require the state to respect the principles of Islamic sharia. See 
discussion supra Part III(E). 
 120. At the urging of secularist Iraqi political groups, the United States insisted 
that the 2004 Iraqi constitution not contain an SSL provision making sharia “the” 
chief source of Iraqi legislation. See discussion supra Part III(H). This was not 
merely because the United States thought such a provision would require state law 
to conform to sharia. Americans also thought that this provision would lead the 
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history of SSL clauses described above, it is striking that, to date, 
most SSL clauses, including clauses that are understood to require 
state law to respect sharia, have had surprisingly little direct impact 
on the legal system at all. Quite simply, courts have proven unable or 
unwilling to use them aggressively to reshape national legal systems.  
As we have seen, some SSL clauses have been drafted in countries 
that did not give courts any power of judicial review.121 In other 
countries, the constitution has singled out the SSL clause as unique 
and has barred courts only from exercising Islamic review.122 In yet 
other countries, judges have creatively interpreted the constitution or 
exercised prudential powers and have held that disputes about the 
Islamic-ness of legislation should be treated as partially or wholly 
non-justiciable. For example, in both Egypt and the UAE, the courts 
creatively interpreted their country’s SSL clause to be partially non-
justiciable. They have the authority only to void un-Islamic 
legislation enacted after the enactment of the constitutional SSL 
provision—a ruling that leaves in place a great deal of controversial 
existing legislation, such as the legislation permitting interest.123 
More dramatic still, Iraqi courts seem recently to have taken the 
position that the question of whether a law is consistent with Islam is 
one that only the political branches are qualified to answer.124  
In countries where courts do exercise Islamic review,125 these 
 
courts to strike down the type of liberal social and economic legislation that the 
United States expected Iraqi parliaments to enact. Similar fears drove secular 
liberal Tunisian groups after the Arab Spring to successfully fight against the 
inclusion of an SSL provision making Islamic norms “the” chief source of 
legislation. 
 121. See discussion supra Parts III(B) n.61, III(F). 
 122. Sudan’s draft constitution of 1968 did envision a constitutional court, but, 
intriguingly, it explicitly said that the SSL provisions were not justiciable. See 
discussion supra Part III(B). 
 123. See discussion supra Part III(D), III(F). 
 124. See discussion supra Part III(H). 
 125. See Clark B. Lombardi, Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court: Managing 
Constitutional Conflict in an Authoritarian Aspirationally ‘Islamic’ State, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Andrew Harding & Peter 
Leyland eds., 2009) [hereinafter Lombardi, Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court] 
(arguing that the claim that secular judges can interpret Islamic law is consistent 
with much modern Islamic legal and political theory and noting that some judges 
clearly believe that they have a constitutional duty and perhaps a moral duty to 
exercise this power and that claiming the right of Islamic review gives them 
considerable power); see also MARTIN LAU, THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN THE LEGAL 
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courts seem to apply the law in a manner that is quite deferential to 
legislative judgment that their law is consistent with Islam. That is 
true of the jurisprudence of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional 
Court referenced briefly above. It develops a jurisprudence that 
adopts a modernist approach to Islamic legal interpretation. That is to 
say, it holds that sharia imposes upon governments only a handful of 
requirements—most of which are very general. Provisions that 
require the state to legislate in accordance with Islam are thus 
understood to leave government considerable discretion to legislate 
in the public interest. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
discuss Islamic constitutional jurisprudence outside the context of 
Arab SSL clauses, it is worth noting that courts outside the Arab 
world seem to interpret constitutional prohibitions on un-Islamic 
legislation in a similar way.  
That courts set few limits does not mean that they set no limits. 
Interestingly, however, the limits that are set are not invariably 
inconsistent with liberal values. Clearly, courts in some countries 
tend to interpret Islamic constraints on legislative discretion in a way 
that precludes the state from enacting laws that realize liberal values 
of equality and individual rights.126 However, courts in some other 
countries do not. Courts in Egypt (and, it is worth noting, courts in 
Pakistan as well) have embraced a modernist view that not only 
tolerates the liberal rule of law, but seems to support it.127  
 
SYSTEM OF PAKISTAN 209 (2006) (stressing that judges in Pakistan exercised 
Islamic review as a way to embark on judicial explorations of previously untested 
areas of Pakistani law). 
 126. The constitutions in Iran and Saudi Arabia do not have SSL clauses, per se. 
Each, though, has a procedure by which courts can review laws for consistency 
with Islam and requires courts to treat non-conforming laws as void. The courts 
responsible for Islamic review seem at times to embrace a traditionalist view of 
Islam’s restraints on state discretion—one that is inconsistent in key respects with 
modern liberal values. 
 127. See LOMBARDI, supra note 78 (concluding that Egypt has refused to strike 
down liberal legislation that is inconsistent with traditional Islamic law and 
sometimes uses Islam’s putative commitment to justice as a justification to protect 
un-enumerated liberal rights); see also LAU, supra note 125 (stating that, in a few 
rare cases, Pakistani courts have struck down illiberal, putatively “Islamic” 
legislation on the grounds that it misunderstands Islam and noting the most famous 
case as being the Hazoor Baksh case, in which the court’s decision led to a 
backlash against the court); Lombardi, Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court, 
supra note 125, at 241 (mentioning the court’s use of Islamic law to support liberal 
decisions on questions of property law and human rights law); Lombardi & Brown, 
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To make sense of this, it is important to remember that Muslims 
in the modern world disagree deeply about fundamental issues: who 
can interpret Islamic law, what method interpreters should use, and, 
ultimately, what laws an Islamic state is required or permitted to 
impose on its citizens. In almost every majority Muslim country, 
illiberal Islamic voices contest fiercely with liberal ones. In 
countries where people agree that the government commit to 
respecting sharia, people may disagree about who should police 
compliance. It is not universally accepted that secular judges are 
better qualified than the political branches to wade through the 
competing interpretations of Islam and determine which 
interpretation should guide the state. This may explain the large 
number of cases in which constitutional courts are explicitly denied 
the power to enforce an SSL clause and the large number of cases 
in which courts with the power of Islamic review have been 
reluctant to enforce it carefully. It also explains why judiciaries 
themselves can come to such different understandings of the 
constraints that Islam requires. 
In short, when looking at countries where the constitution 
requires the state to respect Islam, the liberal-ness of the state’s 
laws seems to depend primarily on choices by the political 
branches. To the extent that courts exercise Islamic review at all, 
they tend to do so in a way that is highly deferential to the 
legislature. In those countries where the courts are willing to apply 
SSL clauses in a way that places significant substantive constraints 
on legislative discretion, the impact on the liberal rule of law 
varies. Ultimately, history suggests therefore that it is hard to 
generalize about the impact of SSL clauses requiring the state to 
respect Islam, and it is particularly hard to generalize about the 
impact they have on the liberal rule of law. The conventional 
wisdom needs to be revised to ask whether a clause will have an 
impact at all and, if so, to say that what sort of impact it will have 
depends on contextual factors that will differ from country to 
country and that may themselves evolve in future years: the 
jurisdiction of constitutional courts, the degree to which 
 
supra note 82, at 380 (commenting on the creative version of Islamic law that the 
Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt has used to find sharia norms consistent 
with aspects of human rights norms, as well as liberal economic policies employed 
by the government). 
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constitutional judges embrace a policy of judicial restraint, and 
whether the constitutional judiciary tends to prefer an illiberal (or 
liberal) interpretation of Islam.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The popular and judicial understanding of SSL clauses in the Arab 
world has evolved over the decades, and it may continue to change in 
the future. If a country today drafts a constitution containing an SSL 
clause making Islamic norms “the” or “the only” source of 
legislation, this clause will probably be understood to require state 
laws to respect Islamic norms—though there is the possibility that it 
will be interpreted to be non-justiciable. Yet, depending on the 
context of its drafting and on the other provisions of the constitution, 
an SSL clause making Islamic norms “a chief source” of Islamic law 
might also be interpreted to require that law respect sharia norms. At 
the same time, a constitutional provision requiring state law to 
respect Islamic law may not adversely affect laws dealing with 
liberal principles of equality and human rights.  
Conversely, the absence of SSL clauses does not mean that Islam 
will be marginalized. Even if they are not constitutionally required to 
Islamize their legal systems, governments can choose to do so. The 
absence of SSL clauses probably provides less safety than some may 
hope. If the champions of an illiberal interpretation of Islam control 
the political branches, they are likely voluntarily to try and establish 
a putatively Islamic regime that reflects their understanding of Islam.  
Those who wish to predict or influence the trajectory of 
democracy and liberalism in the Arab world should not focus 
myopically on the question of how the SSL clause is worded or even 
on the question of whether national constitutions contain provisions 
requiring state law to respect Islam. They should focus at least as 
hard (and perhaps harder) on other questions of constitutional design 
and of social context. Does the constitution create a genuinely 
representative government, such that conservative Islamists who are 
currently powerful will be unable to entrench themselves in power? 
Does the constitution create the conditions for a free and active civil 
society? Does it empower the judiciary to protect liberal rights? Are 
civil society and judges actually vested in the liberal constitutional 
project? Are important figures in each group familiar with and 
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sympathetic to theories of Islamic law that reconcile Islamic law and 
liberal values? With respect to ensuring that this last answer is yes, 
they might pay attention to constitutional provisions or laws that 
regulate the educational institutions and religious institutions that 
help to shape the public’s understanding of Islam and Islam’s 
relationship to liberal values. 
